The following are summaries of selected opinions issued by the Texas Supreme Court in November 2024. These summaries are prepared by court staff as a courtesy and are not a substitute for the actual opinions. The summaries are overviews of the opinions; please review the entire opinions.
JURISDICTION – STANDING
Tex. Right to Life v. Van Stean, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2024 WL ___ (Tex. Nov. 22, 2024) (per curiam) [23-0468]
This case concerns a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act in a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Heartbeat Act.
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants organized efforts to sue those who may be or may be perceived to be violating the Texas Heartbeat Act. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA, which the trial court denied. After the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals held that the TCPA does not apply to the plaintiffs’ claims. It therefore affirmed the trial court’s order. The defendants petitioned for review.
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred by determining the TCPA’s applicability before addressing the disputed jurisdictional question of the plaintiffs’ standing. The Court explained that the standing inquiry is not influenced by the TCPA’s multi-step framework, the second step of which requires a plaintiff to show clear and specific evidence of each element of every claim. That heightened standard is relevant only if the TCPA applies. But whether it applies (or, if it does, whether a plaintiff can satisfy the clear-and-specific-evidence requirement), are merits questions that a court may not resolve without first assuring itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Court further held that under its precedents, a pending TCPA motion cannot create jurisdiction when a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the underlying case. A claim for fees and sanctions under the TCPA can prevent an appeal from becoming moot, but only if a court with subject-matter jurisdiction had already determined that the TCPA movant prevails. If the plaintiffs here lack standing, then no court ever had jurisdiction to declare the defendants to be prevailing parties. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.
PROCEDURE—PRETRIAL: DISCOVERY
In re Off. of Att’y Gen., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2024 WL ___ (Tex. Nov. 22, 2024) (per curiam) [24-0073]
The issue in this mandamus proceeding is whether the trial court abused its discretion by compelling depositions of fact witnesses in a case where the defendant amended its answer and no longer contests liability.
Four former employees sued the Office of the Attorney General under the Whistleblower Act. They sought to depose the Attorney General and three senior OAG employees. OAG amended its answer, stating that it no longer disputes the lawsuit as to any issue and consents to the entry of judgment against it. The trial court issued an order compelling the depositions. OAG sought mandamus relief. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court conditionally granted relief.
It concluded that OAG’s unambiguous statements in its amended answer unquestionably alter the analysis to determine whether the deposition requests show a reasonable expectation of obtaining information that would aid in the dispute’s resolution and whether the burden or expense of the depositions outweigh their likely benefit. The Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider how the narrowing of the disputed fact issues to include only damages affect the need, likely benefit, and burden or expense of the requested depositions. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ additional arguments that the depositions are needed to advance the purposes of the Whistleblower Act and to obtain effective relief through legislative approval of the judgment. The Court concluded that neither argument justifies altering the rules’ limits on discovery obligations in a lawsuit.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY – TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT
Texas Tort Claims Act City of Austin v. Powell, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2024 WL ___, (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) [22-0662]
The issue in this case is whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waives the City of Austin’s governmental immunity.
Officers Brandon Bender and Michael Bullock were involved in a police chase. Officer Bullock was closely following Officer Bender’s vehicle. Officer Bender decided to make a sudden right turn. Unable to slow in time, Officer Bullock struck the side of Officer Bender’s car. The two cars lost control, and Officer Bullock’s car hit Noel Powell’s minivan, which was stopped at the intersection.
Powell sued the City. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction under the Act’s emergency-response exception. To establish the emergency exception, it was Powell’s burden to create a fact issue on either Officer Bullock’s compliance with an applicable statute or his recklessness during the chase. The trial court denied the City’s motion, and the City filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there is a fact issue about whether Officer Bullock’s actions were reckless. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the City’s immunity to suit is not waived. First, no statute specifically applies to Officer Bullock’s actions during the chase, and thus no fact issue could arise as to compliance with one. Second, no evidence supports characterizing Officer Bullock’s actions as reckless.
To qualify as reckless, more than a momentary lapse in judgment must be proven. Instead, there must be evidence that the officer consciously disregarded a high degree of risk. Here, the accident report listed Officer Bullock’s inattentiveness and failure to keep a safe following distance as reasons for the accident. At most, this evidence shows that Officer Bullock was negligent. Powell offered no other evidence to create a fact issue as to recklessness. Because the plaintiff must establish a waiver of sovereign immunity, Powell’s inability to provide evidence essential to the emergency exception means that the City should have prevailed on its plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT
Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. GateHouse Media Tex. Holdings, II, Inc., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2024 WL ___ (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) [230023]
The issue in this case is whether the Texas Public Information Act gives the University of Texas discretion to withhold records of the results of disciplinary proceedings.
The Austin–American Statesman sent a PIA request to the University, seeking the results of disciplinary proceedings in which the University determined that a student was an alleged perpetrator of a violent crime or sexual offense and violated the University’s rules or policies. The University declined to provide the information, asserting that the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act does not require this information’s disclosure. The Statesman filed a statutory mandamus proceeding in the trial court, seeking to compel the disclosure. It then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the PIA revokes the discretion granted by FERPA. The trial court granted the Statesman’s motion, ruling that the records are presumed subject to disclosure because the University failed to comply with the PIA’s requirement that a decision of the Office of Attorney General be sought. The court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the University. The Court first held that the plain language of PIA Section 552.026—which states that the act “does not require the release” of education records “except in conformity with” FERPA— grants an educational institution discretion whether to disclose an education record if the disclosure
is authorized by FERPA. The Court then held that the University was not required to seek an OAG decision before withholding the records. The Court reasoned that the PIA provision imposing the requirement of an OAG decision does not apply to records withheld under Section 552.026, and it noted OAG’s policy refusing to review education records to determine their compliance with FERPA.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SEPARATION OF POWERS
Webster v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2024 WL ___ (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) [230694]
The issue in this case is whether the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine renders the Commission for Lawyer Discipline’s lawsuit against First Assistant Attorney General Brent Webster nonjusticiable.
After the 2020 presidential election, the State of Texas moved for leave to invoke the U.S. Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to sue four other states regarding those states’ election-law changes. The first assistant appeared as counsel on the initial pleadings. After the State’s lawsuit was dismissed for lack of standing, an individual filed a grievance with the commission alleging that the first assistant committed professional misconduct. The commission eventually agreed and initiated disciplinary proceedings that target six statements in the pleadings. Invoking the separation of powers, the district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, holding that neither the separation-of-powers doctrine nor sovereign immunity bars the case.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Young, the Court observed that generally, scrutiny of statements made directly to a court within litigation is by the court to whom those statements are made. In contrast with such direct scrutiny, the commission’s collateral scrutiny seeks to second-guess the contents of the initial pleadings filed at the attorney general’s direction on behalf of the State, which intrudes into the attorney general’s constitutional authority both to file petitions in court and to assess the propriety of the representations that form the basis of those petitions. The separation-of-powers balance is delicate. While courts retain inherent authority to compel all attorneys to adhere to standards of professional conduct within litigation (hence why direct review remains available), the other branches lack the authority to control the attorney general’s litigation conduct (which is why collateral review outside the litigation process would push too far).
This Court’s ultimate authority to regulate the practice of law does not depend on allowing the commission to bring its unprecedented lawsuit. Because this lawsuit does not allege criminal or ultra vires conduct, the first assistant is not subject to collateral review of either the choice to file a lawsuit or the representations in the suit’s initial pleadings. The Court therefore reinstated the district court’s judgment of dismissal.
Justice Boyd filed a dissenting opinion that rejects the Court’s newly minted distinction between the judicial branch’s “direct” and “collateral” enforcement of the disciplinary rules. In his view, the constitutional separation of powers prohibits a branch of government from exercising a power that belongs to another branch but does not separate the powers that exist within a single branch or restrict the means by which a branch may exercise a power it properly possesses. He thus would have held that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not deprive the courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.