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Case summaries are prepared by court staff as a courtesy. They are not a substitute for the actual opinions.
Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. Paxton, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. Apr. 17, 2026) [23-0244]
At issue in this case is whether the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) timely asked the Attorney General if it could withhold contested documents under the Public Information Act. TCEQ received a request from the Sierra Club under the Public Information Act.
According to TCEQ, many of the requested documents were protected against disclosure. So, in a letter to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), TCEQ asked whether it could withhold the documents. Under the Act, that letter was due no later than 10 days after Sierra Club’s request, but the OAG said it received the letter too late. TCEQ asked the OAG to reconsider based on evidence TCEQ failed to include in its letter, but the OAG declined. TCEQ then sued the OAG under the Act, seeking a declaratory judgment to allow it to withhold the documents. Sierra Club intervened. The district court granted summary judgment for Sierra Club, ordering TCEQ to produce the documents. The court of appeals affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that TCEQ did not miss its deadline. The court held that TCEQ’s follow-up email to Sierra Club reset its 10-day clock under the Act because TCEQ attempted to narrow the universe of documents at issue. The court also found that TCEQ gained time back because it established with sufficient evidence that its request was deposited in interagency mail in a timely fashion.
Justice Busby filed a dissenting opinion. He would have held that TCEQ’s email to Sierra Club did not discuss how the disclosure might be narrowed or clarified and, therefore, did not restart the clock under the Act.
Muth v. Voe, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. Apr. 24, 2026) (per curiam) [24-0384, 24-0385]
The issue in this case is whether a series of temporary injunction orders should be vacated as moot.
The Department of Family and Protective Services declared that it would investigate reports that a child was receiving certain medical procedures for the purpose of gender transitioning. Four families with a child diagnosed with gender dysphoria, an advocacy organization, and a psychologist sought injunctive relief to prohibit these investigations. The trial court issued three separate temporary injunctions against DFPS and its Commissioner, which the court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the temporary injunctions for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the claims for injunctive relief by the families were moot either because DFPS had permanently closed its investigation or the family no longer had any minor children subject to investigation. The court concluded that the advocacy group’s claim was likewise moot because the claims of its members in the lawsuit were moot. Finally, the court held that the psychologist lacked standing because her alleged injuries were speculative.
Chief Justice Blacklock filed a concurring opinion. He would have held that the psychologist had standing to challenge DFPS’s actions, but that the temporary injunctions were improper on the merits.
Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Sky Mktg. Corp., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. May 1, 2026) [23-0887]
The issue in this case is whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s grant of a temporary injunction and denial of the plea to the jurisdiction.
The Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services is responsible for maintaining Texas’s schedules of controlled substances. After the Commissioner modified certain definitions within those schedules in 2021, a group of hemp vendors sued the Commissioner and the Department, seeking temporary and permanent injunctions and declaratory relief. The vendors asserted ultra vires claims against the Commissioner, alleging that her modifications purported to control hemp products that the 2019 Texas Farm Bill expressly legalized. The vendors also brought a claim against the Department under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that a statement on the Department’s website was an invalid rule under the Act. The Department and Commissioner responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting sovereign immunity and challenging the vendors’ standing. The trial court granted the temporary injunction and denied the plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed on both counts.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the vendors have standing and that their claims are ripe for judicial review. It further held that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ ultra vires claims because Texas law reposes significant discretion in the Commissioner to establish and modify the schedules and that the Texas Legislature has not eliminated her discretion in a way that rendered the challenged actions ultra vires. The court also held that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ remaining claims against the Department because the website statement is not a rule subject to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of the temporary injunction.
Hancock v. RJR Vapor Co. LLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. May 8, 2026) [24-0052]
In this tax-refund case, the parties dispute whether RJR Vapor’s VELO pouches are taxable as “tobacco product[s]” under the Texas Tax Code.
RJR Vapor sells oral nicotine pouches, which users place between the cheek and gum. When RJR Vapor introduced the pouches to the Texas market, it asked the comptroller for a general information letter explaining whether the pouches were taxable under the Cigars and Tobacco Products Tax. The comptroller concluded that the pouches were taxable. RJR paid the tax under protest and filed this suit, seeking a refund and a declaration that the pouches are not taxable tobacco products. RJR also challenged the constitutionality of the tax statute and its application.
The trial court granted summary judgment for RJR, holding that the pouches were not taxable tobacco products. After a bench trial, it ruled that the language of the Tax Code is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The court of appeals affirmed and held the pouches are not taxable tobacco products but did not reach the constitutional challenges.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Busby, the court concluded that VELO pouches are taxable tobacco products because they are “made of . . . a tobacco substitute.” The pouches’ blend of plant matter and nicotine take the place and function of taxable pulverized tobacco in pouched tobacco products. The court remanded RJR Vapor’s constitutional challenges to the court of appeals.
Justice Sullivan concurred dubitante, expressing doubt as to whether the inclusion of plant matter in VELO pouches should inform the court’s analysis.
