Third Court of Appeals Civil Update December 2025/January 2026

The following are summaries of selected civil opinions issued by the Third Court of Appeals during October 2025. The summaries are an overview; please review the entire opinion. Subsequent histories are current as of November 10, 2025.

LANDLORD/TENANT: Court reverses attorney’s fees awarded after nonsuit.

Collinwood Seniors, Ltd. v. Williams, No. 03-24-00576-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 30, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Williams appealed the justice court’s judgment in this forcible detainer suit to county court. Williams challenged Collinwood’s notice to vacate and sought attorney’s fees. While suit was pending, Collinwood received rental-assistance payments on Williams’ behalf. Collinwood nonsuited and sought disbursement of funds Williams paid into the court’s registry. Williams sought his attorney’s fees, contending Collinwood nonsuited to avoid an unfavorable ruling. The county court found Williams was a prevailing party and awarded fees. Because Collinwood nonsuited without prejudice after receiving Williams’ unpaid rent, the court of appeals concluded Collinwood did not nonsuit to avoid an unfavorable result. Instead, Collinwood nonsuited because it had no ground to evict. Thus, Williams was not a prevailing party. The court reversed and rendered.

TORT CLAIMS ACT: Court affirms dismissal of governmental employee in conversion lawsuit.

Feltner v. Tex. Military Dep’t., No. 03-23-00653-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 10, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Bruce Feltner’s father donated Bruce’s World War I memorabilia to the Texas Military Forces Museum. Years later, Bruce contacted Jeff Hunt, the Museum’s director, to get it back. The Museum refused. Bruce sued Hunt and the Museum for conversion. The trial court granted Texas Military Department’s motion to dismiss Hunt under CPRC Section 101.106(e) and its plea to the jurisdiction on immunity. Bruce appealed the order dismissing Hunt. Bruce argued that the Museum was not a subsidiary of TMD, thus Hunt was not acting in an official capacity. According to the court of appeals, an entity is a governmental unit if it is an agency of the government and derives its status from the Texas Constitution or statutes. TMD is a state agency and thus a governmental unit under the TTCA. TMD’s motion to dismiss confirmed Hunt’s status as an employee. The court affirmed.

DRAM SHOP: Court affirms summary judgment based on safe-harbor defense.

Watson v. Shooters Billiards & Sports Bar, LLC, No. 03-23-00517-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 8, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Family of decedent killed in a car accident sued bar under the Dram Shop Act for overserving the driver. The trial court granted bar’s summary judgment under the Act’s safe-harbor provision. The safe-harbor defense eliminates liability for an employee’s over-serving a patron if: 1) the employer requires employees to attend training classes, 2) the employees actually attend the classes, and 3) the bar did not encourage employees to violate the law. Only the third element was in dispute. The court of appeals rejected family’s argument that the bar encouraged over-service by ordering or rewarding over-service. Family presented no evidence that the bar’s manager was aware of over-service or encouraged employees to continue serving obviously-intoxicated patrons. The court affirmed.

FAMILY LAW: Court reverses death-penalty sanction in a discovery dispute.

Orsinger v. Orsinger, No. 03-23-00664-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 31, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The trial court found father failed to comply with discovery requests and awarded attorney’s fees as sanctions but probated the bulk of the fees pending compliance with discovery. After continued non-compliance, the trial court held father in contempt, awarded additional fees, barred him from offering evidence on the support issues at trial, and found him intentionally underemployed. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion on some of the discovery abuses and by changing a largely-probated, nominal fee award to a death-penalty sanction. The trial court failed to explain why the original attorney-fee award plus additional fees was not considered as a lesser sanction. Further, the trial court abused its discretion finding intentional underemployment based on the failure to answer discovery. The court reversed in part and remanded.