ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Redundant-Remedies Doctrine & Judicial Review of Agency Actions: This case addresses when declaratory-judgment lawsuits complaining of adverse agency actions are barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine.
Gonzalez v. Tex. Med. Bd., S.W.3d, 2025 WL (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025) [24- 0340]
Reynaldo Gonzalez, Jr. holds a medical degree and law degree but is only licensed to practice law. In 2020 he ran for the U.S. House of Representatives and referred to himself as “Dr. Gonzalez” and a “physician and attorney.” The Texas Medical Board issued a cease-and-desist order prohibiting Gonzalez from using these titles without designating the authority giving rise to his use of that title.
Gonzalez filed suit in the district court alleging that the TMB lacks authority to regulate him, that the statutes in question are facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as-applied to him, and that the cease-and-desist order is not supported by the evidence. TMB filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that his suit is untimely under the Administrative Procedure Act and that his declaratory- judgment claim is barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine. The trial court granted TMB’s plea. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that his facial constitutional claim is not barred.
The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded to the trial court. The Court held that the court of appeals should also have remanded Gonzalez’s claims that the statute is unconstitutional as-applied to him and that TMB acted without lawful authority. The redundant-remedies doctrine only bars claims if they would be wholly redundant of an APA claim. But the APA would only have enabled Gonzalez to challenge the cease-and-desist order. Gonazlez’s as-applied and ultra vires claims seek relief from future orders of the TMB, not just the cease-and-desist order.
The Court affirmed dismissal of Gonzalez’s claim that the cease-and-desist order is unsupported by substantial evidence. Gonzalez claims that he did not need to follow the APA’s thirty-day deadline because a TMB regulation gives him the right to judicial review, and that regulation does not specify a deadline. The Court held that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over that claim because only a statute, and not a regulation, can create a right to judicial review.
FAMILY LAW – Termination of Parental Rights: At issue in this case is whether the Department of Family and Protective Services orally abandoned its request for termination of D.V.’s parental rights to her child at trial.
D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., S.W.3d, 2025 WL Tex. Oct. 31, 2025) [24-0840]
In January 2021, the Department removed D.V.’s child from her home and sued to terminate her parental rights after receiving reports of domestic violence. At trial, the Department’s designated representative—one of its caseworkers—testified both on direct and cross-examination that the Department no longer sought to terminate D.V.’s parental rights but to limit her status to parent non-conservator with no rights of visitation or contact. The Department took no steps to controvert this assertion, but the trial court terminated D.V.’s rights. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Department had not abandoned its pleading, relying on what it regarded as the trial’s larger context.
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that in parental-termination cases, which are distinct from other civil litigation for various reasons, an unequivocal assertion by the Department—including its designated representative—constitutes withdrawal of a request for termination. A court may not order termination, therefore, unless the Department clearly repudiates the assertion that termination is no longer sought. In this case, the caseworker’s statement was unequivocal. No contextual features at trial that the court of appeals or the Department identified constitute repudiation of that unequivocal statement, so the trial court lacked authority to order termination. The Supreme Court therefore remanded to the trial court with instructions to appoint D.V. a parent non-conservator, consistent with the caseworker’s testimony and D.V.’s request.