The following are summaries of selected civil opinions issued by the Third Court of Appeals during April 2025. The summaries are an overview; please review the entire opinion. Subsequent histories are current as of May 6, 2025.
MANDAMUS: Court grants mandamus relief, vacating an order disqualifying an attorney.
In re Bradfield Heiser, No. 03-25-00158-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 18, 2025, orig. proceeding). Loeffler sued Heiser to recover commissions related to work performed for their joint ventures. Heiser’s attorney answered, asserting both Heiser’s and the JVs’ claims. Loeffler moved to disqualify Heiser’s attorney contending he violated the rule against dual representation. Heiser’s attorney nonsuited the JVs’ claims and asserted the same claims by Heiser derivatively on the JVs’ behalf. The trial court granted disqualification. The court of appeals observed that the rule against dual representation does not bar an attorney from representing a shareholder’s individual claims and derivative claims on the company’s behalf. In such lawsuits, both sides claim to be aligned with the company. Because both sides purport to sue on behalf of the company, individual shareholders are not opposing parties to the company creating a conflict of interest with their chosen attorney. The court granted mandamus relief.
HABEAS: Court grants habeas relief for failing to admonish party of the right to counsel.
In re Andrews, No. 03-25-00163-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 9, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). The trial court found Andrews in contempt for violations of a child-custody order and ordered confinement in jail for six months but suspended commitment. At a hearing on a motion to revoke the suspended commitment Andrews was unrepresented. The court revoked the suspension of commitment and ordered Andrews into custody. The court of appeals noted that a commitment order is void if it deprives relator of liberty without due process of law. Because a possible outcome of the hearing was Andrews’s incarceration, she was entitled to be admonished of the right to counsel under Family Code §157.163(b). The trial court admonished Andrews of her right not to incriminate herself, but did not advise her of the right to counsel. Accordingly, the court held Andrews was entitled to unconditional release and granted habeas relief.
FAMILY LAW: Court reverses modification order that leaves mother’s visitation to discretion of father and children.
Stone v. Stone, No. 03-23-00801-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 18, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). In this modification proceeding, the trial court gave father the right to designate the primary residence and included a “teenager provision” that ordered mother’s possession to be determined by agreement of father and the children. The order stated it was unenforceable by contempt. The court of appeals observed that orders that deviate from the standard possession order by limiting possession may not exceed those terms that are required to protect the child’s best interest. Further, such orders must specify the times and conditions of possession. The teenager provision provided no scheduled visitation for mother unless father and the children agreed. No evidence supported the severe restriction on mother’s possession and no authority supports granting children complete discretion over a parent’s possession. The court reversed in part and remanded.
PARENTAL TERMINATION: Court reverses failure to grant agreed request to extend dismissal date.
B.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Prot. Servs., No. 03-24-00661-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 11, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Although all parties supported Department’s request to extend the automatic dismissal date, the trial court denied the extension and terminated parents’ parental rights. The court of appeals noted that Family Code § 263.401(b) permits a court to retain a termination case if there are extraordinary circumstances and continuing the case is in the children’s best interest. Both parents were complying with their service plans but needed additional time to complete them. Prior orders showed the trial court intended to return the children to parents upon completion of the service plans. Accordingly, the trial court was required to find extraordinary circumstances. Further, all interested parties agreed the extension was in the children’s best interest. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the extension. The court reversed and remanded.